

# The World in 1980: America's Basic Options



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*Following is an address by Charles William Maynes, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, at the University of Minnesota on February 29, 1980.*

The past year, especially the past several months, bore witness to momentous events in world affairs, events that have neither run their course nor are as yet predictable in their outcome. Yet they have already, in subtle but important ways, reshaped our national psyche. We have become more conscious of the risks of war. We have become more aware of the urgent, inescapable tasks of peace.

President Carter, in his state of the Union address, outlined the substance of these challenges for the decade of the 1980s as "The steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world. . . ."

Each of these portends new convulsions and none promises easy victories. In combination, they not only challenge our leadership in the world but seem to question our very aspirations. A *Pravda* editorial of January 29 already has gone so far as to write the obituary of America's leading role in world affairs, accusing the United States of not wanting "to reckon with the established alignment of forces in the international arena."

The world has indeed changed compared to the undisputed leadership position we held at the end of the Second World War. Then, our military might was unmatched, our economy was dominant, and our influence was unparalleled. Though we tended at the time to speak fearfully of the red menace, the Soviet Union was busy nursing the wounds of invasion and internal bloodletting and setting up its household in Eastern Europe. We enjoyed overwhelming nuclear superiority as well as an economy which was virtually invulnerable to outside shock.

Today, we are in a comparatively less advantageous position. Let there be no doubt about that. We helped others get on their feet, and our power has declined relatively. Yet our leadership still is expected because we still are the most powerful and influential nation on Earth, militarily, economically, and, because of the vitality of our institutions, politically.

The basic option facing us is not whether we want to be the only significant leader in shaping the affairs of mankind—that period is over—but whether we wish to exert a major influence in world affairs which we can do in cooperation with others.

We need not fear playing a leadership role in cooperation with others. The United States has traditionally promoted and welcomed increased international pluralism. From Wilson's 14 points ushering self-determination into this century to Kennedy's call about "making the world safe for diversity," we have espoused and practiced a type

of leadership that, even when we towered above others, attempted to gain for others a place in the sun. It is not an accident that the United States is the father of the two most disruptive but fundamentally positive ideas in the 20th century—internationally sanctioned and encouraged self-determination and economic development. Others say naively—but I believe not without reason—we continue to maintain we will be better off and freer if others are better off and free.

These two American ideas have wrought a transformation in world politics. Yet it remains a source of national strength, I believe, that we have not changed the essential character of our Nation, nor have we changed our basic support for these two principles. We wear the mantle of *realpolitik* uneasily, and even those who try to persuade us to shoulder it find themselves compelled to argue that American policy must acquire a larger vision than narrow national interest. As *realpolitik* practitioner Henry Kissinger has himself admitted, "No nation could face or even define its choices without a moral compass that sets a course through the ambiguities of reality and thus makes sacrifices meaningful."

### Soviet Threat to World Peace

We must keep this fundamental point in mind when we confront the now serious threat the Soviet regime represents to world peace. The present crisis created by the latest application of Soviet "tank-socialism" does represent a new and perhaps much more dangerous dimension in East-West relations.

It is more dangerous for at least three reasons. First, because this new thrust of Soviet expansionism comes at a time of apparent domestic crisis within the Soviet system. Second, because the Soviet move against Afghanistan appears to have been prompted by a series of miscalculations. And, third, because it reveals a Soviet attempt to redefine the scope and rules of detente.

Let me explain. I am neither a Kremlinologist nor a physicist, but for the sake of illustration let me borrow from their respective disciplines. It may be that the thermodynamic law of entropy has finally and fully caught up with the Soviet system, which now seems to expend more energy on simply maintaining its equilibrium than on improving itself. We could be seeing a period of foreign movement at a time of internal decay.

Laws and theories aside, the facts of Soviet life speak for themselves. The fact is that after 60-some years of in-

credible and inhumane sacrifices to build a new society, the Soviet system still cannot meet the most rudimentary needs of its citizens. The fact is that its agriculture remains a disaster area, its technology—except for the military—primitive. The fact is that it is ruled by a privileged geriatric class unable or unwilling to share power with the younger generation. The fact is that its hold over its satellites in Eastern Europe has never been shakier. The fact is that it is engaged in a deadly rivalry with other Communist nations and parties. These realities cannot escape the attention of the aging members of the Politburo. I mention these developments not because I believe in the imminent collapse of the U.S.S.R. but because we must understand Soviet weakness as well as Soviet strength.

The second reason for the current aggravation of tensions lies in the Soviet miscalculation. The miscalculation is not in the act of invasion itself but in a lack of understanding of the long-range consequences. In all probability, the Soviets would have invaded Afghanistan irrespective of the nature of anticipated reactions—whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Their own sense of geopolitics and paranoia probably made them determined to put the neighboring Afghan house in order—at whatever cost. The assumption that had the United States been "tougher" on a number of recent peripheral international issues, such "toughness" would have discouraged the Soviet intrusion is, in my opinion, untenable. The invasion itself was a calculated risk—a Leninist "two-step-forward-one-step-back" tactic—that falls into the pattern of the past when any Soviet misdeed was followed by a period of consolidation accompanied by a new "peace offensive."

Soviet miscalculations concern the long-range consequences of their action. A brief historical comparison may be helpful. The Baltic aggression of the 1940s took place during the Second World War when the world's attention was still focused on the Nazi threat. The invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia occurred in the context of direct East-West confrontation where the United States had shown in Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 that it was also determined to prevent countries in its sphere of influence from attempting radical shifts in political orientation. Cuba remained the great exception, and the United States and the U.S.S.R. moved close to a nuclear confrontation in 1962 before certain ground rules concerning Cuba could be established.

But today's international scene is drastically different. While Afghanistan may be considered by the Russians to be in their traditional sphere of interest, it has never been one of their own satellites. On the contrary, Afghanistan is a country of the Third World, a member of the nonaligned bloc, and part of an increasingly assertive Islamic movement. The Soviet tanks may have rolled into Afghanistan for reasons I have described before, but their advance has led to more than a stiffened resistance of the Afghans. With their invasion of a Third World country, the Soviets are posing a direct and unprecedented threat to all Third World countries. These countries may have—until now—believed that Soviet expansionism sought its coveted prizes in other directions, mainly in Europe, which is not their own concern, or by subterfuge and through proxies—as in Ethiopia and Angola—which, or whom, they might have thought they could check and control.

With their direct subjugation of a nonaligned nation, the Soviets have violated the most important tenet of nonalignment, the principle of noninterference by the strong in internal affairs of the weak so that the weak can be protected from the strong. After the Havana summit of the nonaligned, where the Cuban-inspired shotgun wedding of this movement with the Soviet bloc failed, it is very doubtful that even some of the more radical nonaligned countries will be quite so eager to move into the bear's embrace. And with their continuing repression of the religious aspirations of their Muslim population, the Soviets are poor candidates to parade as the champions of another Arab cause, the cause of the Palestinians.

In the final analysis, it may well be that it is the Soviets who have deluded themselves that their role as banker and arms merchant for the most radical of the Third World countries would automatically assure them overall Third World support for their mischievous behavior. The recent overwhelming vote by the U.N. General Assembly on Afghanistan should at least cause us to question this belief. As the *New York Times* wrote after the Afghan vote: "The self-styled 'natural ally' of the Third World was all but buried in the Monday roll call." Among the nonaligned countries, 59 voted in favor of the resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and only 9 against. Of the countries which comprise the Third World, 78 voted yes and only 9 voted no, with the rest abstaining or not participating.

In the Security Council, the resolution that prompted the Soviet veto had the approving vote of the Third World countries. In an earlier Security Council resolution demanding the withdrawal of Soviet ally Vietnam from Kampuchea, seven nonaligned members of the Council voted for the resolution that the Soviets vetoed. This is perhaps why Soviet policy toward the Third World has recently moved into overdrive with Soviet representatives frantically attempting to be seen in support of the most extreme formulations of issues sacred to radical members of the Third World. Thus, at the recent conference of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, the Soviets voted yes for a \$300 billion industrialization fund of the Third World. Then, when Third World delegates left the room, the Soviet representatives whispered that the Soviet Union could not contribute to it.

It would be premature and an oversimplification to conclude that their brutal move into Afghanistan would automatically create new configurations of alliances and power in the world scene. There is no clear pattern of aggressive intent. Rather, the element of threat lies in the volatile, unpredictable reactions and counteractions that can now occur. Nationalistic antagonism and ideological strife are not new in the Third World. The Soviets have tried in the past, sometimes successfully, usually not, to channel these conflicts in a direction of their own interests. But now for the first time they are part of, and a participant in, such a conflict that entails the risks of direct superpower confrontation.

Related to this is the third reason for the potentially critical dimension of the current East-West tension—the Soviet attempt to redefine the scope and rules of detente. Detente is a complex and unstable mix of competition and cooperation between the two superpowers. It may not be too early to write the eulogy for detente as a word. French in origin, it confuses monolingualistic Americans. But if we abandon the word, we cannot abandon the process. Developing a sound and stable relationship with the Soviet Union must remain the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s. Campaign rhetoric aside, we have no other options. This does not mean that we do not make it clear that the Soviets must leave Afghanistan. But once those troops are gone, we must strive to resuscitate the relationship.

In giving this priority to U.S.-Soviet relations, we must avoid mistakes we all made in overselling de-

tente. It was oversold, not because it promised a generation of peace but because it became the exclusive organizing principle of policy while neglecting too many other important variables. As formulated and sold to the American public, it required that we ignore that there are other tensions besides those between East and West, and it overlooked the harsh political reality that detente by itself, without a supporting international milieu and institutional framework, would always be subject to the vagaries of time and to the struggles of leadership in either of the superpowers.

One of the principal tasks facing our government in the 1980s is how to explain our relationship to the American people so they can understand what is difficult to understand—namely that our relationship with the Soviet Union will be—in Jimmy Carter's phrase—a mix of cooperation and competition or—in Dr. Kissinger's—a "dual policy" involving both, and that the only goal of a sane foreign policy must be to strive to increase the cooperative aspects and reduce the competitive aspects of the relationship. Yet as the experiences of the overselling of detente should have told us, attempting to arrive at a more coherent and politically acceptable approach to the Soviet Union is no substitute for efforts to deal with the other major issues of foreign policy. And among the most important of these in the 1980s will be our relationship to the Third World—an issue the Carter Administration has tried to stress in the belief that developments there will be significant in determining the degree of global stability we wish to enjoy.

### The Pressures of Change

What is the "Third World"? The term covers a very heterogeneous grouping of nations with divergent interests. On one issue, however, they coalesce: They want social, political, and economic change in the international order of things, which they believe will help them and we fear will hurt us.

It is not, however, this pressure for change itself wherein the threat to global stability from the Third World lies. The threat lies in the volatile and interrelated nature of the problems and obstacles facing the global community—the Third World as well as the industrialized countries—together with our inability to understand or our unwillingness to accept that we share a common fate.

As we enter the decade of the 1980s, an increasing number of persistent problems—the energy crisis,

hunger, pollution, and the continuing violations of human rights—crowd the global agenda. These complement as well as fuel more traditional threats to collective security posed by the dangers of nationalistic excess, ideological extremism, and imperialistic ambitions.

It is easier to recognize the traditional threats. They are as visible as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. They are as frightening by their sheer, insensible terror as the attack on the ambassadors in Colombia. Yet if the other threats are less obvious, they are just as pernicious and just as deadly. Hungry, frustrated people, too, are a threat to peace. Inflation and global monetary chaos, too, are a threat to peace. The energy crisis, too, is a threat to peace.

The dynamics of an interdependent world presume that solutions lie in the direction of an integral approach, in cooperation. Yet the converse is also true. That interdependence implies a condition of mutual vulnerability which provides openings for miscalculations and mischief. Stress and strain on any particular point in the web of relationships among critical global issues, as well as countries, can cause corresponding or even worse stresses and strains on other parts. Thus, the combined effect of crises may be qualitatively graver than the sum total of each.

Global prospects afford us neither the luxury to perceive threats to peace in an isolated, truncated way nor a chance to react to the global problems as if they could be dealt with in a serial fashion. Yet for Americans this is very difficult to do. Steeped in a tradition of positivist and linear thinking, we are wont to tackle problems on a first-come-first-served basis. Having been proven successful in contractual negotiations—after all, what aspect of our life is not secured by fine print—we prefer to bargain point by point even as we sometimes lose sight of the larger issues at stake.

The history of American foreign policy is a history of singular preoccupations—with eras differentiated by all-embracing priorities: containment, liberation, Atlantic alliance, detente, Vietnam syndrome, and now arcs of crisis—each perceived in its own time as the archpin, the keystone of our global posture. But it is no longer accurate or appropriate to analyze the international political system in strictly East-West terms or the global economic structure on a strictly North-South basis. Major changes have occurred in the power and economic well-being of many developed and de-



veloping countries and in the manner the superpowers relate to the Third World. These changes affect every American, whether they are hostages in Tehran or daily commuters in their automobiles.

Our relationship with the Third World epitomizes the nature of the problem. The dependence of Western democracies on the Middle East oil supplies is the tip of the iceberg of a relationship of multiple dependencies that is in turn aggravated both by the volatile conditions in the Third World itself and by our own ignorance of issues and trends there.

Occupation of foreign embassies, to take one example, cannot be seen simply as acts of diplomatic brigandage. They must be placed in context, not for the purposes of finding hair-shirt excuses or harebrained justifications but in order to see the underlying causes of friction and crises which are graver in the long run and in combination than the immediately apparent ones.

I am sure that you have heard *ad nauseam* the grievances that countries of the South hold against countries of the North. I am also sure you and I would enjoy preparing a counterbrief. Yet the result is sterility and stalemate. So permit me, instead, to focus on a tripartite *problematique* that presents an unprecedented challenge to our conduct of foreign affairs. Three factors interplay.

- First, a growing and assertive nationalism.
- Second, a growing and menacing global economic crisis.
- Third, steadily alarming signs of "overload" in the international system of conflict resolution and problem solving.

It is a paradox but also a fact that our age of homogenizing global communications and internationalism coexists with, perhaps has even given birth to, a new strain of virulent nationalism, which takes many forms—usually political or ideological, at times racial or ethnic, and occasionally as in Khomeini's Iran, xenophobic and religious. But contrary to sophisticated clichés, assertive nationalism is not the exclusive contagion of Third World countries, which have passed from colonial status into the puberty age of nationhood. After all, from our neighbors in French Quebec to our cousins in Belfast, from Catalonia to Transylvania, from Corsica to Puerto Rico, from the Uzbek S.S.R. to the West Bank, forces are loose that defy conventional assumptions and treatments. They emerge as forcefully in

face of repression as in the wake of liberalization. They express themselves both in dignified nonviolent resistance and in outrageous terrorism.

In the Third World the pressures for change find their outlet in nationalistic assertions. Indeed the desire for change did not end with the dissolution of colonial empires; on the contrary, it only began then. At times it expresses itself in the most strident rhetoric of anti-Western feeling—and now it may be Russia's turn—and often it consumes itself, pitting countries of the Third World against each other. Consider Vietnam and Kampuchea, Ethiopia and Somalia, Algeria and Morocco.

What gives this nationalism an added element of danger is the continuing and accelerating arms race within the Third World itself. Over the past 20 years, the spending for conventional arms in the developing countries has increased almost 600%, and their overall share in the total global military expenditures has grown from 3% to 15%. Too many of them are now threshold nuclear powers. Many—such as Brazil, India, Nigeria, Cuba, Korea, and Iraq—are regional military powers. There are practically no areas of the world—from Southeast Asia to Central America—that have not experienced in the last decade the horrors of war or armed civil strife.

Conflicts which erupt at the political level are in turn fueled by enormous pressures at the economic and social level. The Third World counts among its ranks some of the richest countries, such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, whose populations' per capita income is higher than that of the Western industrial democracies. Yet, even with these countries, the Third World nations, which comprise a substantial majority of the world population, receive only 15% of the total global income. Almost 1 billion people in the developing areas face starvation. The steady rise in oil prices has slowed down growth rates, threatened the future development prospects of most oil-importing Third World countries, and through a ratchet effect now weakens the entire international financial order.

Whether one subscribes to "worst case" scenarios or remains optimistic that in the long run solutions will be found to the current global economic predicaments, the fact is that the present strains portend the probability of major political, economic, and military upheavals in the 1980s. Such upheavals, in turn, jeopardize not only the development prospects of the Third World

and continuing progress and welfare of the industrialized countries, but the very lifeline of the world economy and the overall strategic balance. The 1980s will be a decade of extraordinary turbulence.

The overwhelming dependence on oil supplies from the Middle East is a dramatic aspect, but not the complete picture, of how dependent we have become on the Third World and of how indispensable the health of our economy is for the integrated development of the entire globe, including the Third World.

U.S. trade with the developing countries—excluding the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—now exceeds the combined trade we have with Europe, the Socialist countries, and Japan. Industrialized countries are the major market for the products of the developing countries. In turn, developing countries purchase about 90% of their imported manufactures from the developed world. We import some of the most strategic raw and processed minerals and metals. We import 100% of our natural rubber; almost 100% of the manganese, cobalt, bauxite, and chrome we use; and more than two-thirds of our nickel, tin, asbestos, and platinum. Conversely, the United States is the major supplier of high technology, the source of innovation and scientific knowledge for most of the developing countries, and our food export is often the difference between starvation and subsistence for hundreds of millions of people.

The recitation of facts will not, in itself, present a coherent program for solution. The pressures for change, the demand for a new world order, may find their justification in this list of troubles and trouble spots, but that does not necessarily mean that in combination they automatically translate into a global strategy resting on the political and economic interdependence of a greatly changed world. Rather we should characterize today's world as one of great dependencies without interdependence.

We have moved in one generation from a world of a dozen leading nations—nearly all sharing common racial and sociocultural traditions and defined by a rough balance of power between two nuclear superpowers—to history's first version of global politics. The developing countries have become actors rather than objects on the international scene, as many of them have emerged from the "Greek Chorus" to the front of the stage. But all this seems to be leading toward a politics of instability and

danger, not of cooperation and progress.

In the 1980s we will be facing a new and very complex agenda of problems that will tax all statesmen and the adaptive capacity of the international system which may well collapse from the weight. This international system will be more than the sum total of the changing relationship between the Soviet Union and the Third World and of the North-South dialogue. And it will be more than the U.N. system as we know it today.

For us to begin to grapple with the complexities of this new world, there will be no alternative to a multilateral system that is capable of simultaneously dealing with a myriad of crises. Today the United Nations is far from being this instrument of global politics. But it could evolve into an institution of greater global responsibility if:

- The impact of contemporary events could infuse the United Nations with new importance and new sources of strength;
- We could find a greater spirit of cooperation than before—not just in condemning the lawless but also in advancing the rule of law;
- We could adopt a more mature stance toward the concept of international cooperation and toward the United Nations itself and its family of institutions.

For too long and far too often, our body politic has emitted contradictory and confusing signals about our commitment to international institutions and their relevance in the conduct of our foreign affairs. In turn, this attitude has symbolized our ambivalence about other, equally sensitive steps needed to deal with the world's problems.

Some of us still harbor idealistic notions and designs for international institutions that were present at the time of their creation. And we expect of them the impossible. Others expect nothing. And they urge policies that would insure that result. Neither view serves us well nor does justice to the United Nations or other international bodies. Reflective of high ideals, in a real world they are constrained by the limits of the possible. They are neither a morality play as some would wish nor the "most concerted assault on moral reality" as one of their detractors said.

Facile judgments such as these are not very helpful to make the United Nations or other international institutions function better. The United Nations is more than rhetoric and debate. It is one of the most encompassing sys-

tems in the international community, one of the busiest multinational corporations with concerns spanning from humanitarian relief to nuclear safeguards, from peacekeeping action to the elaboration of international codes. With its specialized agencies and programs, its regional organizations and international conferences, the United Nations has become an increasingly indispensable engine of global development. Over the years, it has assumed a seminal role in setting the pace and direction for international cooperation.

But the United Nations can accomplish only as much as its member states, including the United States, are willing to do together for the United Nations. Its burden of responsibilities can soon become, however, an excessive load if the support it receives is not commensurate with our expectations.

### The Basic Options

History rarely grants to contemporaries the instant recognition of its own watersheds. But events in Afghanistan and Iran may have given us that chance: to realize that we are in a new era of global politics with the unavoidable obligation of leadership to shape these politics in a responsible manner. To put it squarely or to put it simply, the "great decision" we face is: What role do we as a nation want to play in this altered, dangerous, frustrating, and often exasperating world? What are our basic options for the 1980s?

The broad options for America's world role in the 1980s are clear enough.

**Fortress America.** Our first option is to build fortress America. We can develop in our anger or disgust a hard-nosed policy of America-first nationalism. Proponents of this course argue that, as the strongest political, economic, and military power, we can afford "to go it alone" better than any other country. They are correct. We can do it better even if we cannot do it well. We are perhaps the only nation, along with the Soviet Union, which can seriously consider such a policy. The United States could expand its armaments even more. It could forego the task of policing the world, but it could police its own backyard.

But, as suggested, being able to afford this policy better than others does not mean that it is in our interests. Such a policy would require severe adjustments in our standard of living. Our daily lives are now affected profoundly

by events around the world and not just in areas closer to home. Oil, commerce, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism can touch us at any time and in untold ways. Moreover, this is a policy that even a ruthless regime like the Soviet Government is increasingly discovering is too costly to carry out. The larger margin for independence which some of the Eastern Europeans enjoy is not the result of Soviet good intentions but cold Soviet assessment of the cost of trying to maintain the rigid controls of the past. So in the end we, too, would find we cannot hide. If we as a people try to do so we will not only fail, as we did in the 1920s, but will in the process further undermine the remaining foundation stones of stability and predictability on which a relatively peaceful international system rests. The reason for this is not hard to find. You cannot remove the world's strongest power and central balancing force from the international system without creating a vacuum. It is a sober lesson of history that the filling of such vacuums often leads to much greater misery and devastating wars.

**Atlas America.** Our second option is atlas America, on the other side of the spectrum. The United States could shoulder again the responsibilities of global guardian. As in the 1950s and 1960s, regardless of region or cost, the United States could again assume the principal responsibility for providing order to a lawless world. We could recall the ringing summons of John Kennedy's inaugural address which in recent years we have perhaps too quickly deprecated. After all, a world without order is a dangerous world; the most recent examples of the lawless state may have shocked the world community into a realization of that fact. But a world order depending solely on American muscle and money would require enormous sacrifice from our people. It is simply not realistic to expect this except in times of war.

**Participant America.** There is a third option which would call on America to be a full participant in collective efforts with allies and friends to attack and overcome the foreign problems we face. This option is in my view consonant with our resources; with our traditional support for justice and order; and with the needs of the changing international system we have described today. This option would forge a new global political consensus, which respects our national interests—and those of other countries—but which also reflects a heightened sense of international mind-



edness. If I may coin a term "an enlarged patriotism/a measured internationalism"—a patriotism and internationalism based on mutual interest, mutual responsibility, and mutual restraint. This consensus should be built on the growing parallel interests between the more responsible developed and the more responsible developing countries in economic and energy stability, of all nations in East-West peace and disarmament, and in the common interest on the resolution of regional disputes.

Our first effort failed miserably with the debacle of the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations' inability to deal with the chaos of the 1920s, the great depression, and World War II.

Our second, post-World War II effort has been far more successful yet increasingly inadequate. We should take pride in the singular contribution we as a nation have made to the world over the last 35 years. But the postwar system when it worked best depended on a massive undergirding of American power to be effective. Today we find that the scope of the problems has vastly increased and that for these solutions our power is no longer sufficiently dominant. Consequently, our former policy of solving problems with American power and American resources—which seemed unlimited by comparison—no longer is sustainable.

Yet we need now, on the eve of the 1980s, to adapt to the changing world and to move forward to this third try of controlled idealism and realistic expectations.

I believe that President Carter's principal foreign policy achievement can be to move us clearly into this new period in our foreign policy where we can recognize how vital it is that we meet our international responsibilities. In that period:

- Our alliances will remain central to our security and economic well-being;

- Dialogue and negotiation with the Soviet Union and China will be central to world peace; and

- We will understand better and cooperate more with those Third and Fourth World states that will work with us.

We will take no nation for granted and will be quick to see that none takes us for granted.

Many of the most urgent issues will be on "global problems"—energy, nuclear nonproliferation, conventional arms restraint, law of the sea, en-

vironmental protection, refugees, narcotics control, food, population, human rights, and terrorism.

We will want wherever possible to approach problems through a collective response which is always easier in an institutional framework. We will want to use the United Nations, the world's only universal body, to cope with these problems and with the inevitable regional crises. But where universality is an elusive basis for internationalism, we will deal with the world's problems in other multilateral ways. Regional organizations, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Andean Pact, often provide promising instruments. We will need to be more imaginative in the way we approach the costs and responsibilities of international cooperation. We probably will need to find ways to raise revenues through taxation of the global commons. We probably will need to accept more restraints over our sovereign right to act unilaterally. We will need to accept formal commitments to combat global poverty.

If we have the courage and the foresight to choose the participant America option, we do not need to coin new catch phrases like detente or promise new frontiers of adventure. What we need is wisdom in foreign policy, wisdom at the citizen's level as well as in the White House. The three pillars of this wisdom, to borrow from and paraphrase my predecessor as Assistant Secretary, Harlan Cleveland, are:

- First, an understanding that domestic and international politics are two aspects of each other;

- Second, that each foreign policy issue is part of all foreign policy issues; and

- Third, that we cannot go at it alone and must, therefore, recognize the limits of power of the nation state and emphasize instead the potentialities and necessities of collective action.

By all tests, and despite Iran and Afghanistan, I strongly believe in the workings of this wisdom and that we have acquitted ourselves well in the past 4 years.

We are fortunate to have witnessed and participated in some of the most significant advances toward freedom and democracy that the modern world has known. While controversial, this Administration's decisions have changed the course of history. While there are as always varied perspectives on each theme, each decision unquestionably highlights a benchmark of progress for the world community.

Today marks the day of the first democratic elective process in a free Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Only 5 years ago such a notion would have been dismissed as impossible and at best one chance in a million.

This very week we have seen the formal exchange of ambassadors and establishment of diplomatic channels between two nations who were at war—what seems only months ago. The Camp David accords, aiming at a comprehensive settlement, is an unprecedented and incredible occurrence in efforts to bring peace to the Middle East.

The Panama Canal treaties mark the beginning of a new era of cooperative exchange and joint economic activity and good will between our country and our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

What was once the lone voice of the United States calling for justice and human rights is now being echoed around the globe. While we cannot take credit for all of these trends, our Nation has provided impetus for this people's movement—and a greater understanding of representative forms of government. The era of the Bokassas, the Idi Amins, and Macias is now far behind us as nations have had to respond to close scrutiny by the world community.

The North-South dialogue has taken on new dimensions as we embark on a decade of a more cooperative interdependent spirit.

We have a new relationship with the People's Republic of China, the largest Communist nation on Earth. We continue to build correct and mutually beneficial relationships with the East European nations.

Our role in the United Nations is more effective and influential than it has been in years.

These are examples, perhaps highlights, of the recent past. The problems ahead are even more daunting. Now, with the mounting prospects of worldwide crises, our full participation is needed more than ever before. I hope we will have the courage to offer it. ■

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